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Article 6

THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Thomas E. Spahn
As the practice of law becomes more complex, we must
constantly remind ourselves not to overlook some of the
basic elements of our trade. One of the most important, yet
often misunderstood or misapplied, doctrines governing our
activity is the attorney-client privilege. This brief
article summarizes the privilege and offers practical
suggestions for its creation and maintenance.
Introduction
Issues involving the attorney-client privilege pervade
every aspect of our practice. In litigation, cases are won
or lost every day because the privilege has not been properly
Ignorance of the
created or, once created, has been lost.
privilege can also jeopardize our clients' interests in
non-litigation contexts. The importance of the attorneyclient privilege to lawyers is heightened because the
creation and maintenance of the privilege is almost exclusively the lawyer's--not the client's--responsibility. A
lawyer who neglects the privilege can subject himself to
malpractice liability as well as the loss of this client.
Rationale for the Privilege
The attorney-client privilege dates from at least the
1500's. As originally envisioned and still recognized
today, the privilege fosters the creation of satisfactory
arrangements and the resolution of disputes among members of
society by assuring that clients can freely communicate with
their lawyers--upon whom society has placed the burden of
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creating those arrangements and resolving those disputes. ='
However, this societal benefit has a cost--the privilege
hampers the search for truth by concealing undeniably
relevant communications. This tension has been apparent
from the beginning, and results in t, attorney-client
privilege being narrowly construed. Scope of the Privilege
The source of the privilege varies by state. Some
jurisdictions have codified their privilege, while others
(including Virginia) continue to rely on the common law.
Fortunately, most jurisdictions have reached a general
consensus on the privilege's contours.

2/ North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power
& Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 513 (M.D.N.C. 1986); United
States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 873-74 (4th Cir.
1981); Upiohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89
F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
3/ North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power
& Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 513 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Cal.
1985); O'Leary v. Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641, 644 (M.D.N.C.
1985); United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th
Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir.
1965); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,
Furthermore, the party claiming the
602 (8th Cir. 1977).
Attorney
privilege has the burden of establishing it.
General of United States v. Covinaton & Burling, 430 F. Supp.
1117, 1122 (D.D.C. 1977).

The mpt common formulations of the attorney-client
can be distilled as follows:
privilege The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure
communications
(1) from a client;
(2) to his lawyer or his lawyer's agent;
(3) relating to the lawyer's rendering of legal advice;
(4) made with the expectation of confidentiality;
(5) and not in furtherance of a future crime or tort;
(6) provided that the privilege has not been waived.
Perhaps the most common mistake made by lawyers today
is not taking time to carefully analyze each component of
the attorney-client privilege. The privilege is specific
and limited. For instance, the existence of an attorneyclient relationship does not geate a presumption that a
A party seeking to immunize
communication is privileged. ar the burden of
communications from discovery must
Even if the privilege
proving the privilege's existence.
exists, it is circumscribed. For example, it does not
protect from disclosure all correspondence between a client
and his lawyer, or all correspondence with a lawyer's name
on it. Similarly, the privilege does not protect all
documents in the lawyer's possession.

4/ There are a number of traditional formulations for the
privilege. The most common are Judge Wyzanski's in United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
(D. Mass. 1950) (quoted in NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 904
(4th Cir. 1965)), and Wigmore's (cited by a number of
courts, such as In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir.
1977)). These and other similar formulations contain the
common denominators cited in the text of this article.
5/ O'Leary v. Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641, 644 (M.D.N.C.
1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356
(4th Cir. 1984).
6/ Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp.
1146, 1161 (D.S.C. 1974).
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In every instance, it is necessary to assess each of
the six factors listed above.
(1) Communication from a Client
This is an important factor, since thl/privilege
As the client's
belonas to the client and not the lawyer.
agent, the lawyer must therefore be sure to properly create
the privilege on all occasions and take care not to waive it
(see below).
The term "client" is defined expansively. Communications
to a lawyer from a prospective client are privileged, even
if the contact never blossoms into an actual attorney-client
ngers even after
relationship. Moreover, the privilege
The lawyer's
the attorney-client relationship ends.
obligation to keep his client's confidences secret lasts
forever, as does 9 , third party's inability to discover those
communications. When the "client" is a corporation, special problems
arise. A corporation's lawyer repregents the legal entity
Yet, a corporation
and not any directors or employees. can only act through such individuals. An obvious question
poses itself--which corporate directors or employees fall
within the attorney-client relationship.
Some courts ruled that only individuals in upper
management--called the "g_ trol group"--were within the
In Uipohn Co. v. United States,
scope of the privilege. 0
449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981), the United States Supreme Court
rejected this "control group" rule in certain aspects of
federal law, and most states have followed suit. Under the
7/ See, e.a., Seventh Dist. Comm. of Virainia State Bar v.
Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 286-87, 183 S.E.2d 713, 719 (1971).
8/ Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility EC 4-6.
9/ Taylor v. Taylor, 45 Ill. App.3d 352, 2 Ill. Dec. 961,
359 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1977).
10/ Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-18.
ii/ See, e.a., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975).

Upjohn analysis, any corporate employee is within the scope
of the attorney-client relationship if all six criteria are
met. Whether the corporation's lawyer is talking to the
president or a janitor, the privilege applies if the traditional criteria are satisfied.
While easily stated, the Upjohn rule does not eliminate
the need for a lawyer's care. In fact, this area of practice
poses the greatest risk of not properly creating the privilege.
For instance, the privilege will not arise if the corporate
employee does not know (1) that the person with whom he is
dealing is the corporation's lawyer and (2) that the communication is necessary for the lawyer to advise the corporation. Corporate employees talk daily with people "sent by
headquarters "--including fellow employees, consultants,
accountants, as well as lawyers. In order to create the
privilege, the corporation or its lawyer must identify the
lawyer as such, and describe the purpose for his communication
with corporate employees.
(2) Communication to a Lawyer
Technically, theprivilege protects from disclosure
only comirications from a client to his lawyer (and his
agents)
--not vice versa. However, the privilege also
covers communications from lawyer to client to the
ent
they would reveal what the client told his lawyer. As a
practical matter, nearly every communication from a lawyer
will fall within this rule.
Still, to assure that the privilege arises, it is best
to communicate precisely. If a lawyer writes his client
with advice, the letter should make it clear that the client

12/ BurlinQton Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 40 (D.
Md. 1974).
13/ North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power
& Liqht Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 514 (M.D.N.C. 1986); United
States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 874 (4th Cir. 1984);
Brinton v. Department of State, 636 F.2d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Ohio-Sealy
Mattress MfQ. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 28 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37
(D. Md. 1974).
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has provided information to the lawyer and sought advice
based on that information.
(3) Communication Relating to the Rendering of LeQal Advice
In some cases, this test is easy to apply. For instance,
lawyers constantly withhold as privileged cover letters to
their clients. In nearly eyay case, these lawyers are
A cover letter normally does
misapplying the privilege. not reflect any confidential communication from the client,
and certainly contains no legal advice.
In other cases, it is more difficult to determine if
the communication relates to the rendering of legal advice.
Lawyers can play many rolei-business advisors, draftsmen,
Only 1
rendering of legal
marriage counselors, etc.
advice gives rise to the privilege. To the extent that
there might be a dispute, a lawyer should be careful to
include within each communication to his client an explanation
that he is rendering legal advice.
(4)

Communications with the Expectation of Privacy

As explained above, the attorney-client privilege arose
from society's encouragement of complete candor between a
client and his lawyer. However, this justification for the
privilege exists only if the client and lawyer expect their
communication to remain secret. If a client knows that

14/ Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 145
(D. Del. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Deerina Milliken, Inc., 397
F. Supp. 1146, 1168 (D.S.C. 1974).
15/ J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523, 526
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
16/ North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power
& Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 514 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Diversified
Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977).
At
least one court has applied a "primary purpose" test to
determine if a communication containing both legal and
nonlegal advice is privileged. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977).
17/ United States v. (Under Seal),

748 F.2d 871, 874 (4th
(Footnote Continued9

a communication with his
privilege never arises.
his lawyer to reveal the
third party, thee is no
no privilege. L

lawyer will be revealed, the
For instance, if a client directs
substance of a communication to a
expectation of privacy and therefore

In most cases, the analysis is not that simple. For
this reason, lawyers must treat all communications with
their clients as confidential unless the client explicitly
orders otherwise.
Of course, there is automatically no expectation of
privacy if a stranger is present when the lawyer and his
client communicate. Sometimes, the third party is not
explicitly invited. For example, a lawyer who is foolish
enough to speak with his client about legal advice on a
crowded elevator will find that the privilege does not
protect the communication.
In other cases, the third party is invited to hear the
communication. For example, it is risky to have other
family members present when discussing a client's will.
Similarly, many lawyers politely ask their client's accountants or financial advisors1Lk leave the room when legal
advice is being discussed.
In a business context, the concept of a "third party"
is often difficult to define. Businessmen working toward a
compromise have a common goal and may be trying their best
to cooperate with one another, but are legal adversaries. A
lawyer should never discuss legal matters with his client in
the presence of a business adversary.

(Footnote Continued)
Cir. 1984); Burlinaton Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26,
33 (D. Md. 1974).
18/ In re Grand Jury Proceedinas, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th
Cir. 1984); United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875
(4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976).
19/ If the accountant or other professional is assisting
the lawyer in rendering legal advice, his presence during
such conferences will not vitiate the privilege. United
States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972).
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In at least one aspect of the litigation arena, the law
allows the privilege to arise even if third parties are
present. If the third party is a codefendant or otherwise
shares the client's interests in litigation, a "joint
defense" thI 8 y envelopes such joint discussions with the
privilege. However, lawyers must still exercise caution.
Today's codefendants creating a joint defense can be tomorrow's
cross-claim adversaries.
(5) Communications not in Furtherance of a Future Crime or
Tort
On first consideration, this factor would seem to
preclude any criminal defendant from safely communicating
with his lawyer. But the key is the word "future". A
defendant can freely discuss past crimes or torts with his
lawyer. But to the extent that the client communicates with
his lawyer about a crime or tort which he is planning to
commit, society does noy ermit the privilege to cloak the
discussion in secrecy.
(6) The Privilege has not been Waived
For lawyers, this is the most important component of
the privilege. Mistakes are easy to make and can cause
appalling consequences. There are two kinds of waiver-express and implied.
(a)

Express Waiver

Express waiver of the privilege occurs if a client
or his lawyer reveals a privileged communication to a

20/ See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90
F.R.D. 21, 29 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 394
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330
F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964).
21/ See, e.g., Coleman v. American Broadcasting Co., 106
F.R.D. 201, 206 (D.D.C. 1985); Cogdill v. Commonwealth, 219
Va. 272, 276, 247 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1978); Seventh Dist. Comm.
of Virginia State Bar v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 183 S.E.2d
713, 719 (1971); Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143,
144 (4th Cir. 1967).

third party. As mentioned above, the presence of a
third party when a communication is initially made
between a lawyer and client precludes the privilege
from ever arising. The privilege is waived when that
confidential communication is later shared with a
stranger to the attorney-client relationship.
An express waiver can be intentional. For instance,
the client might boast to an adversary that "my lawyer
tells me

.

.

."

Such a client would be chagrined to

learn that he may just have waived his privilege.
Similarly, a lawyer might voluntarily provide privileged
documents in cooperating with a government probe.
Despite society's interest in such cooperatioi,/the
A
lawyer might well have waived the privilege. more understandable express waiver occurs if a client
or his lawyer voluntarily reveals a privileged commuu 7
2cation in order to gain an advantage in litigation.
An intentional express waiver can occur in as
mundane a circumstance as a lawyer's dinnertime conversation with a spouse or in as bizarre a setting as a
lawyer writing a book about his client. This lesson
was brought home to Professor Alan Dershowitz of
Harvard, who recently found that he had waived the
privilege protecting his communications with his client
Bulow by describing those communications in a
Claus Y
Lawyers must be careful to never intentionally
book. waive the privilege themselves, and advise clients of
the risk they undertake in speaking with adversaries or
third parties about privileged communications.
An express waiver can also be inadvertent. In
large document productions, for instance, privileged

22/ See, e.c., Permian Corr. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiff waived privilege by
voluntarily producing documents to SEC, and thus could not
object to the SEC sharing the documents with the Department
of Energy).
23/ Handcards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp.
926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
24/ American Lawyer (March 1987) at 9.
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documents can be accidentally produced. Courts'
reactions to such unintentional production of documents
have been mixed. Some courts hold that the inadvertent
production of documents during a large document production
cannot accurately be characterized as "voluntary" and
thus is not a waiver. Other courts hold that the
accidental production of documents is "voluntary" eL 97
if not intentional--and thus waives the privilege.
The scope of any waiver is discussed below.
If a lawyer finds that he has inadvertently
produced a privileged document, it is best to
immediately request its return. Some lawyers facing
large document productions agree upon nonwaiver pacts
under which accidentally-produced privileged documents
will be returned by both sides upon specified notice.
These agreements are not without risk, sp9 e some
courts ignore them in finding a waiver. The most frightening form of express waiver is
exemplified by Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. SwissBernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
In

25/ See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
104 F.R.D. 103, 105-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Kansas-Nebraska Natural
Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb.
1983); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951,
954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Transamerica Computer Co. v.
International Business Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.
1978) (refusing to order IBM to produce privileged documents
accidentally disclosed in an earlier litigation).
26/ See, e.g., In re Howard Indus., Inc., 67 Bankr. 291,
293 (D.N.J. 1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d
1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984); Diotima Shipping Corp. v. Chase,
Leavitt & Co., 102 F.R.D. 532, 537 (D. Me. 1984) (finding a
modified subject matter waiver); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Sea Land Serv., Inc. v. United States,
444 U.S. 915 (1979).
27/ Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank, 103
F.R.D. 52, 67-68 (D.D.C. 1984); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman,
Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976).

Suburban, plaintiffs sifted through defendants' trash
dumpster for two years. This unpleasant task netted
them hundreds of privileged documents that defendants
had discarded. The court held that defendants had not
taken reasonable steps to assure confidentiality of the
documents (such as shredding) and therefore expressly
waived the privilege. Under this approach, the negligent
handling or destruction of documents--not just the
negligent production of documents to an opponent--can
amount to a waiver.
While a merciless rule like that applied in
Suburban Sew 'N Sweep might seem counter-instinctual,
the same cannot be said of other forms of inadvertent
express waiver. Lawyers discussing their client's
business in restaurants or elevators run the terrible
risk of waiving the privilege. There is a story-perhaps apocryphal--about a New York City law firm
which periodically sent secretaries and paralegals to
ride up and down the elevators of its opponent's law
firm's building. Using this simple method, the law
firm was able to acquire valuable--and privileged-information about its adversary. Avoiding this form of
inadvertent express waiver requires only common sense
and self control--lawyers should never discuss their
client's business if a third party can overhear them.
(b)

Implied Waiver

The attorney-client privilege can also be impliedly
waived. Although an express waiver arises from revealing
confidences to a third party, an implied waiver occurs
when other societal or legal considerations outweigh
the need for secrecy. The two most common forms of
implied waiver demonstrate this principle.
First, a lawyer is free to waive the privilege
t his client attacks him (as in a malpractice action).
In that setting, the client cannot challenge the
lawyer^2pd then block the lawyer from defending himSecond, an implied waiver occurs if the
self. -

28/ Pruitt v. Peyton, 243 F. Supp. 907, 909
1965).
29/ State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, I1
(1961)
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(E.D. Va.

N.W.2d 255, 260

client or his lawyer injects 3 0to the litigation the
advice given by the lawyer. The most common
example is a malicious prosecution action, in which the
client can escape liability by proving that he initiated
criminal process on his lawyer's advice. As in the
first example, the client cannot take advantage of this
defense without waiving the secrecy created by the
privilege. To hold otherwise would immunize the client
from cross-examination.
(c) Scope of Waiver
If a party is found to have waived his privilege,
a second question presents itself. What is the scope
of the waiver?
When addressing truly voluntary disclosure of
privileged communications, the courts faced an easy
analysis. Simple fairness precludes a party from
voluntarily revealing some privileged information to
gain an advantage, and then cloaking other privileged
communications in secrecy. In those situations, courts
have routinely held that voluntary disclosure of some
privileged communications is a waiver as to "the
remainder of th~lrivileged communication about the
same subject."
The same is generally true of
implied waiver.
When the express waiver is inadvertent rather than
intentional, the analysis becomes more difficult. For
example, since even an inadvertent production of
documents can be considered "voluntary," some courts
have held that the unintentional production of privileged documents results in a broad subject matter

30/ In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Handcards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Huahes, 332
F.2d 602, 615 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 380 U.S. 249
(1965).
31/ In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Handpards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929
(N.D. Cal. 1976).

Other courts conclude that any waiver
waiver. L
resulting from the inadvertent disclosure of privileged
ends no further than those communications
information
themselves.
Although most decisions addressing this issue
involve document productions, the same considerations
would govern the other forms of inadvertent express
waiver discussed above. Given these divergent approaches
to waiver, lawyers must take all possible precautions
against even the inadvertent disclosure of privileged
documents or communications.
Conclusion
To a large extent, lawyers hold in their own hands the
power to properly create the privilege and avoid its waiver.
All written communications with clients should document the
privileged nature of the communication. Lawyers should warn
their clients not to share privileged communications with
any third parties. Most importantly, lawyers should scrupulously avoid discussing their clients' business with any
third parties (even their spouses or friends) or in any
setting in which the conversation could be overheard. This
rule sounds simple enough, but remember it the next time you
are on an elevator or at a restaurant and realize that you
are listening to lawyers waiving their clients' privilege.

32/ In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1357 (4th
Cir. 1984); Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank, 103
F.R.D. 52, 63 (D.D.C. 1984); Nye v. Sacze Prod., Inc., 98
F.R.D. 452, 453 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Duolan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161-62, 1191 (D.S.C.
1974).
33/ Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486
See also Diotima
F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
Shippina Corp. v. Chase, Leavitt & Co., 102 F.R.D. 532, 537
(D. Me. 1984).
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